

## Mali Food Security Policy Research Program

### IMPROVING AGRICULTURAL POLICY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE IN MALI: STAKEHOLDER DIAGNOSTICS AND PRESCRIPTIONS

By

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## INSTITUTIONS

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**Institut d'Economie Rurale (IER).** Created on November 29 1960, IER est the principal agricultural research institute in Mali with nearly de 800 staff, of which 250 are scientific researchers in various agricultural disciplines. IER operates 6 regional centers, 9 stations and 13 sub-stations. Scientific research at IER spans 17 specific research programs.

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**Michigan State University (MSU).** Established in Michigan, MSU is the oldest of the US Land Grant Colleges, with a long history of agricultural and policy research in the USA, Africa, Asia and Latin America.

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## ACRONYMS

ADR	Agence de Développement Régional
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AOPP	Association des Organisations Professionnelles Paysannes
APCAM	Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d'Agriculture du Mali
CAP	Cellule d'Analyse et de Prospective
CCIM	Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Mali
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CILSS	Comité Permanent Inter – Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel
CLSP/MEF	Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté
CNOP	Coordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes
CNRA	Comité National de la Recherche Agricole.
CRA	Chambre Régionale d'Agriculture
CMDT	Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles
CPS/SDR	Cellule de Planification et de Statistiques du Secteur Développement Rural
CSA	Commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire
CSCRP	Cadre Stratégique pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté
DNA	Direction Nationale de l'Agriculture
DNI	Direction Nationale de l'Industrie
DNPIA	Direction Nationale de la Production et des Industries Animales
DRA	Direction Régionale de l'Agriculture
DRP	Direction Régionale de la Pêche
DRPSIAP	Direction Régionale de la Planification, de la Statistique, de l'Informatique, de l'Aménagement du territoire et de la Population
DRPIA	Direction Régionale de la Production et des Industries Animales
ECOFIL	Programme de Recherche en Economie des Filières
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FOSCAR	Forum des Services de Conseil Agricole et Rural du Mali
FSP-IL	Food Security Policy Innovation Lab
FTF	Feed the Future
GOM	Government of Mali
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
IER	Institut d'Économie Rurale
IFDC	International Fertilizer Development Center
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
INSTAT	Institut National de la Statistique
IPR/IFRA	Institut Polytechnique Rural/ Institut de Formation et de Recherche Appliquée
LOA	Loi d'Orientation Agricole
MSU	Michigan State University
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OMA	Observatoire du Marché Agricole
OPAM	Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali
ORIAM	Réseau des Opérateurs d'Intrants Agricoles
PDA	Politique de Développement Agricole du Mali
PNIP-SA	Plan National d'Investissement Prioritaire Dans Le Secteur Agricole
PNISA	Plan National d'Investissement Dans Le Secteur Agricole

PNVA Programme National de Vulgarisation Agricole  
PREPOSAM Projet de Recherche sur les Politiques de Sécurité Alimentaire au Mali  
PROMISAM Projet de Mobilisation des Initiatives en Matière de Sécurité Alimentaire  
USAID United States Agency for International Development



# 1. INTRODUCTION

Policy influences agricultural performance in fundamentally important ways. In Mali, a wide range of laws, regulations and programs affect land tenure, water infrastructure and access, plant and animal health, availability of new seed technologies, transport cost, electricity, labor markets, input prices and trade. Together these policy incentives shape the investment, production and marketing decisions of farmers and agribusinesses. Decisions by key private sector actors, in turn, drive agricultural growth trajectories. Sound policies, therefore, become a critical pre-requisite for broad-based, sustainable agricultural productivity gains and improved food security.

This report summarizes stakeholder assessments of the quality of Mali's agricultural policy processes. In a first stage, our team interviewed 80-plus stakeholders involved in agricultural policy processes. The interviewees represented five general categories of stakeholders: government, private sector, researchers, donors and nongovernmental civil society groups involved in agriculture and food security. Interviews included both national-level actors as well as regional actors in three major agricultural regions of Mali. The stakeholder survey, summarized by Traoré et al. (2017), resulted in identification of two key weaknesses in Mali's agricultural policy system: a) limited private sector involvement; and b) weak implementation.

In a second stage, the team convened workshops with the original survey respondents in Bamako and three major regional centers across Mali to validate their initial diagnosis and to explore possible means of improvement. This report summarizes both stages of analysis, the stakeholder diagnoses as well as their prescriptions. In the end, we hope these results will enable Mali's new government to identify practical ways of improving agricultural policy making processes.

## **2. OVERVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY PROCESSES**

### **2.1. Profile of Mali's agricultural sector**

Agriculture serves as the economic backbone of Mali. Together, crops, livestock and fisheries provide primary employment for 80% of Mali's labor force and roughly 40% of GDP (INSTAT 2019). Agricultural exports of cotton and livestock account for 20% of Mali's export earnings. Farm production centers on cotton and coarse cereals (millet, sorghum, rice and maize) as well as livestock. The Niger River and inland delta also provide rich fishing grounds as well as significant, though underexploited, potential for intensive fish farming. Although agricultural productivity remains generally low by international standards, significant potential exists for raising productivity in irrigated agriculture, livestock production and inland fisheries.

Nearly two-thirds of Mali is desert. Hence, Mali's population concentrates primarily along the Niger River, its inland delta and tributaries and in the moderate rainfall areas of southern Mali. Roughly 10% are semi-nomadic herders. Since the occupation of northern Mali by armed groups and the subsequent military coup of 2012, instability and insecurity have amplified internal population movements and placed increased pressure on Mali's pasture and farmland. High fertility (6 births per woman) and population growth rates (3%) place growing pressure on Mali's farmland, pastures and on its extensive-but-fragile ecological resources.


In this environment, effective agricultural policies become essential for providing the public goods and private sector incentives necessary for realizing Mali's considerable agricultural potential. For this reason, Mali's government has placed agriculture at the center of its strategy to combat poverty and improve food security (CSCR, 2012; PNISIA 2011). The political and administrative systems through which the Malian government sets policy objectives and implements are described below.

### **2.2. Political system**

Under Mali's system of government, agricultural policies typically involve two distinct administrative steps. First are the laws that form the basic legal framework and codify the content of major agricultural policies. The Loi d'Orientation Agricole (LOA) and the new Land Law (Loi Foncière) provide recent examples of major legal enactments framing key elements of agricultural policy. In a second step, implementation by line ministries in the executive branch requires a series of administrative decrees or orders from the designated executive authority – either the President or a designated minister – to guide the actions of implementing agencies.

For two decades, from 1992 to 2012, Mali selected its political leaders through multi-party democratic elections. At that time, the collapse of governing institutions in neighboring Libya, in 2011, fueled widespread instability throughout the West African Sahel. A series of Tuareg uprisings and armed jihadist groups triggered near-continuous insecurity in northern Mali, leading to a military coup in 2012 and an Islamist take-over of northern Mali. Military rule and the resulting constitutional crisis lasted for 16 months. This period ended with the democratic election of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) in 2013. Under an emergency United Nations resolution in December 2012, Mali officially enlisted outside military assistance from the French and from a

coalition of West African troops provided through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In 2015, the Malian government signed a peace treaty with two major rebel groups under which French and ECOWAS troops continue to assist the Malian military to maintain control in the northern section of the country. This ongoing insecurity has complicated many facets of governance in Mali, including in the agricultural sector. Donor assistance for agriculture has generally trended downwards, while external funding for emergency security support has grown rapidly (Figure 1). In 2019, despite several delays and popular protests, IBK was re-elected to a second five-year term as President.



In normal times, Mali operates a semi-presidential representative democratic republic, which the Economist Intelligence Unit refers to as a “hybrid regime”. Under the Malian constitution, citizens elect their President through direct universal suffrage for a five-year term as head of state. The president, in turn, names a Prime Minister to serve as head of government under Mali’s multi-party system. Executive power rests with the government, while a popularly elected 160-member National Assembly holds legislative powers. The president chairs the Council of Ministers which submits proposed laws to the National Assembly for approval. An independent judiciary interprets the laws and adjudicates legal disputes.

The National Assembly passes legislation. To become operational, however, laws require implementing decrees and ordinances. As specified in each specific statute, implementing decrees may be issued by the President or by the relevant Minister.

In the agricultural sector, two ministries hold key portfolios. The Minister of Agriculture is responsible for all crop production activities, while a separate Minister of Livestock and Fisheries administers all programs of support for animal-based productive activities. Jurisdiction overlaps and interests sometimes conflict in areas such as land use and water resource planning and development.

At times in the past, these two ministries have been combined into one, while other times, they operate separately, as they do currently.

At the sub-national level, Mali is divided into ten regions and 56 districts (called “cercles” in French). An elected Governor serves as chief executive in each region, while each district is run by a Prefect. Locally, each of the line ministries place officers in the regional headquarters where they coordinate efforts with local officials. In each region, the Governors chair a Regional Executive Committee for Agriculture through which line ministries, local researchers, farmer organizations, NGOs and agribusiness associations share experiences and coordinate activities.

### **2.3. Public agricultural institutions**

Line ministries and a series of semi-public institutions implement many of Mali’s agricultural policies through the research, extension and regulatory services they provide for Malian farming and livestock communities. In each of Mali’s ten administrative regions, the Ministry of Agriculture posts a Regional Director to head the Direction Régionale de l’Agriculture (DRA). The regional DRA leads the extension and regulatory services provided in the region, including the administration of input subsidy programs. The Ministry of Livestock similarly posts Regional Directors of Production and Animal Industries (RNPIA) to manage veterinary services, animal health and production services.

Agricultural research is publicly funded in Mali through the Malian government budget and with strong donor support. The Institute of Rural Economy (IER) is the nation’s principal agricultural research institution, with research stations in each major agro-ecological zone and a series of laboratories for plant and soil testing. The Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, in turn, operates the Central Veterinary Laboratory and Animal Nutrition Laboratory.

In Mali’s major cash-cropping zones, a series of parastatal enterprises provide extension services in place of the DRA. In the cotton zone of southern Mali, the Compagnie Malienne du Développement Textile (CMDT) provides not only regular extension services but also packages of cotton and maize inputs on credit, which farmer repay at harvest time when they sell seed cotton to the CMDT. In the Niger Delta, Mali’s Office du Niger (ON) manages irrigation infrastructure, ensures farm input delivery and provides extension services to producers in this primarily rice and horticulture production zone. The Office de la Haute Vallée du Niger (OHVN) provides similar support to farmers in the upstream reaches of the Niger River. Outside of these parastatal zones, farmers rely on the often highly stretched, understaffed DRA extension services.

### **2.4. Private sector stakeholders**

Malian farmers have built up a network of farmer organizations which, in several notable cases, have made major impact on agricultural policies. The most visible of these concern the largely farmer-initiated cotton sector reforms of the early 1990s (Tefft 2010). To provide a lobbying arm at regional and national levels, the Association des Organisations Professionnelles de Producteurs (AOPP) represent over 100 farmer organizations involved in rice, cotton, cereals and livestock value chains. At the regional level, Chambers of Agriculture exist to voice general farmer concerns. Nationally, the Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d’Agriculture du Mali (APCAM) serves as the organization representing broad farmer interests to government.

Agribusiness groups have also formed to represent the interests of key private sector stakeholders. Mostly, these include suppliers of farm inputs and implements as well as traders, transporters and processors of agricultural outputs. These agribusiness groupings represent Mali's local and regional agribusinesses as well as importers who serve as local distributors for international agri-business firms. The Organisation du Réseau des Opérateurs d'Intrants Agricoles (ORIAM) represents agricultural input suppliers – primarily fertilizer, seed, feed and pesticide importers. The Fédération des Exportateurs du Bétail et de la Viande (FEBV) represent the interest of Mali's many regional livestock exporters, while the Association des Exportateurs des Fruits et Légumes (AEFL) similarly represent the interest of fruit and vegetable exporters.

## **2.5. Consultative processes**

These various agricultural sector stakeholder groups interact through a variety of informal and official consultative processes. Farmer and agribusiness groups convene meetings on specific topics of interest. Most of the apex organizations, such as APCAM and ORIAM, hold formal annual meetings. From the government side, regional agricultural committees hold convening power over local public and private sector stakeholders. Nationally, the Comité Nationale de Recherche Agricole (CNRA) provides a forum for researchers, government and farmer groups to discuss key priorities and emerging findings. Donors coordinate through a variety of sectoral working groups. A National NGO Coordination Secretariat, Drylands Coordination Group and the National Executive Committee on Agriculture all serve to enable key stakeholder groups to share information and coordinate activities. Twice annually, Malian and regional pesticide regulators meet in Bamako to discuss emerging policy and implementation issues. In addition, as issues arise, the Malian government forms temporary working groups to address specific pressing issues – for example to track problems with fertilizer subsidy program implementation or emerging conflicts related to land management.

### 3. METHODS

#### 3.1. Policy system diagnostic

Stage 1 of this work involved interviews with key policy system stakeholders during which they provided a qualitative assessment of agriculture and food security policy processes in Mali. To begin work, our team put together a list of key stakeholders involved in agricultural policy processes. In order to ensure representation of differing perspectives, this initial listing categorized key stakeholders in five general categories: government, private sector (including farmers and agribusiness groups), researchers, donors and nongovernmental civil society groups involved in agriculture and food security. To ensure national as well as regional representation, the stakeholder listing and survey interviews took place in four locations: Bamako, Kayes, Sikasso and Ségou.

In total, we compiled a listing of approximately 100 key stakeholders from these five key constituencies. The team then contacted all 100 local institutions in order to poll key groups of Malian agricultural sector stakeholders about their perceptions of the quality of policy processes, decisions and implementation.

Using a formal survey instrument, each stakeholder provided his or her experience with policy process as well their subjective ratings of policy processes, institutions and outcomes. Table 1 outlines the broad rating categories assessed, while Annex 1 provides the full questionnaire through which stakeholders rated Mali's agricultural policy processes.

Section	Contents
A	Respondent profile
B	Quality of the policy formulation process
C	Quality of the institutional architecture
D	Factors influencing the formulation of new agricultural and food security policies

Source : Annex 1.

From the initial stakeholder listing, the team contacted the head of each agency or business to request their cooperation in assessing the policy system. Given the choice of electronic questionnaires or in-person interviews, most preferred to schedule in-person interviews for discussion and rating purposes. Most institutions required multiple visits. Indeed, many of the interviews had to be rescheduled multiple times. In the end, out of 100 institutions contacted, we were able to conduct full interviews with 83 respondents. The interviews took place in June and July 2017, using the calendar year 2016 as reference year.

Table 2 provides a profile of the stakeholders interviewed. Of the 83 stakeholders, roughly half work in government, one-fourth in the private sector (farming or agribusiness), 15% in research or nongovernment organizations and 6% work for major agricultural sector donors. Geographically, about half of all respondents work in national institutions, based primarily in Bamako and nearby areas. The other half of interviewees work in regional offices for government, various research institutions or the private sector. Only 2 of the 83 respondents were female, roughly 2%. This

reflects the reality that males dominate leadership positions in agricultural institutions, both public and private. The stakeholders interviewed were generally highly experienced. On average, they had spent 10 years with their current institution (Table 2).

To ensure open and honest answers from all respondents, our survey team guaranteed strict confidentiality to all respondents. To protect their confidentiality, this report provides only aggregate summary scores for each stakeholder group<sup>1</sup>. Annex 1 provides a listing of the various institutions included in each stakeholder category.

Institutional category	Respondents		Gender (percent)		Years with organization
	number	percent	men	women	
<b>Government</b>					
national	16	19%	94%	6%	8
regional	30	36%	100%	0%	6
<b>Private sector</b>					
national	10	12%	90%	10%	14
regional	9	11%	100%	0%	12
<b>Researchers</b>					
national	10	12%	100%	0%	18
regional	2	2%	100%	0%	35
<b>Donors</b>	5	6%	100%	0%	11
<b>NGOs</b>	1	1%	100%	0%	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>98%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>10</b>

Source: Traoré et al. (2018).

### 3.2. Prescriptions

Stage 2 of this policy system assessment involved the convening of four one-day stakeholder workshops at which all of the original interviewees could discuss the consolidated results, validate or critique the findings and discuss possible remedies for the two major weaknesses observed collectively by the stakeholders in Stage 1. The Stage 2 prescriptive workshops took place in January 2019<sup>2</sup>. To facilitate stakeholder participation, the workshops took place in same four localities where the initial diagnostic survey had taken place (Table 3). In each locality, the team invited the

<sup>1</sup>Because only 1 NGO fully completed the questionnaire, we cannot report their results separately without violating confidentiality. To protect the confidentiality of their responses, we have included their responses in the total of all rating criteria but not as a separate stakeholder category

<sup>2</sup>The one-year delay between compilation of results (in December 2017) and convening of these workshops (in January 2019) occurred because of the highly contentious Malian elections of 2018, originally scheduled for the springtime but which finally took place in July and August of that year, with legislative elections scheduled to follow later in the year. The delayed release of these survey results aimed to avoid politicizing the results. Rather than issuing them during the heat of a presidential election campaign – when a critique, however honest, of current government policy procedures could easily become fodder for opposition candidates – the team consciously elected to publish the results following the election when they could serve as input at the start of a new government.

same people they had originally interviewed to discuss and comment on the aggregate findings from them and their colleagues.

The workshops had three explicit objectives:

- present, critique and validate the consolidated survey results
- identify causes of the two major policy system weaknesses identified
- propose solutions to the two identified policy system weaknesses.

Location	Date	Chair	Institutions represented
Bamako	10-Jan-19	Prime Minister's representative	51
Kayes	15-Jan-19	Governor's Counsellor of Economic and Financial Affairs	10
Sikasso	22-Jan-19	Governor's Counsellor of Economic and Financial Affairs	10
Ségou	25-Jan-19	Prefect, Circle of Ségou	11

Source: Samaké et al. (2019).

Prior to the stakeholder workshops, each respondent received a full set of consolidated survey results (Traoré et al. 2017a) as well as a four-page summary brief (Traoré et al. 2017b). Following the workshops, the team prepared a detailed summary of the proceedings, including the small-group report-out diagnosis and prescriptions produced at each of the four workshops (Samaké et al. 2019). Collectively, this documentation forms the basis for the consolidated summary presented in Chapters 4 and 5 below.



## 4. DIAGNOSTIC RESULTS

### 4.1. Who influences policy outcomes?

Overall, nearly two-thirds (63%) of stakeholders interviewed had participated in formal agricultural and food security policy processes in the prior year. The level of engagement, however, varied across stakeholder groups.

National government and donors engage most heavily in policy formulation. Over 80% of respondents from each group have actively engaged in the formulation of a specific agricultural or food security policy (Table 4). During the 2016 calendar year, the national government and donor respondents attended an average of 4 to 5 policy-specific meetings, workshops or seminars.

In contrast, the private sector appears to be less engaged in policy processes. Only 56% to 60% have actively engaged in the formulation of a specific agricultural or food security policy. Stakeholders uniformly consider private agribusinesses as least effectively engaged in policy processes. Note that each respondent was asked to rate the engagement and level of policy influence of his/her own institution as well that of all other stakeholder groups. Consistently, each of the stakeholder groups rated private sector as least engaged and least influential in Mali's agricultural policy processes (Traoré et al. 2017a, Table 4).

Institutional category	Participation		Level of policy influence of your institution				
	number of policy workshops attended in 2016	in the policy formulation process a specific agricultural policy	0 none	1 limited	2 moderate	3 high	
Government							
national	3.7	81%	6%	25%	19%	50%	100
regional	2.7	57%	3%	33%	40%	23%	100
Private sector							
national	2.2	60%	20%	30%	40%	10%	100
regional	2.0	56%	0%	44%	33%	22%	100
Researchers							
national	1.8	70%	10%	10%	30%	50%	100
regional	2.0	0%	0%	0%	50%	50%	100
Donors	4.5	80%	25%	0%	50%	25%	100
Total	2.7	63%	7%	27%	34%	32%	100
Legend:							

Legend:  = highest responses  
 = lowest responses

Source : Baseline survey of agricultural policy processes in Mali.

Mali's private sector, likewise, appears to have the least influence in shaping policy decisions. Fifty percent of national farmer and agribusiness groups say they have little or no influence on policy decisions. Nearly half (44%) of regional private sector representative feel similarly uninfluential (Table 3).

In contrast, 75% of donors believe they exercise moderate or high levels of policy influence. Government actors likewise believe that their input helps to shape policy decisions. Among national government officers, 69% believe they exercise moderate or high levels of influence in shaping policy decisions. At the regional level, 63% of government officials claimed to exercise moderate or high levels of policy influence (Table 3).



Perhaps surprisingly, Malian researchers consider themselves be the most influential of all stakeholder groups. Eighty percent of national researchers and 100% of regional researchers indicate that they have moderate or high levels of influence on policy decisions (Table 4). Malian researchers -- from institutions such as IER, CNRA, OMA, INSTAT and IPR/IFRA -- repeatedly cited examples of their engagement with policy processes and generally believe that decision-makers listen to their views and respect their technical expertise.

#### **4.2. Factors motivating policy decisions**

Policy reform requires initiative, energy and expenditure of political capital. For these reasons, policies typically change only rarely. When asked what factors have driven agricultural and food security policy reforms in Mali, stakeholders identify two major factors (Table 5). First are major shocks or triggering events, such as a drought, a natural pest invasion or world food price spikes (Table 5, variable 5.1). Second, is the conviction of key decision-makers leading reform efforts (Table 5, variable 5.7). During our original interviews, stakeholders noted that when the president or an influential minister champions a specific policy, the probability of successful reform improves significantly. During the stakeholder validation workshops, participants emphasized that increasingly, climate change was motivating agricultural policy reforms, particularly in areas of land policy and agricultural research.

Least likely to trigger reform overall are pressure groups (local business lobbies, for example) and local media coverage (Table 5, variables 5.2 and 5.5). Nevertheless, in specific instances, pressure groups can clearly play a key role in motivating reforms, most notably in the cotton sector reforms of the early 2000s.

Table 5. Key factors motivating agricultural policy reform in Mali

<b>Factors contributing to policy reform</b>	Average score
0 = none; 1 = modest; 2 = significant ; 3 = very important	
5.1. A focusing event (a crisis, natural disaster, change of government) triggered reform	1.8
5.2. A stakeholder advocacy group initiated reform	1.0
5.3. Does the policy issue address a critical problem for key segments of the population?	1.7
5.4. A pressing problem motivated policy reform.	1.4
5.5. Broad media coverage of the issue?	1.0
5.6. Ideas and beliefs of key stakeholder advocates shaped the policy decision and design.	1.7
5.7. Ideas and beliefs of government leaders shaped the policy decision and design.	1.8
5.8. Ideas and beliefs of donors.	1.7
5.9. Research evidence shaped the design.	1.2
5.10. Role of financial cost-benefit calculations.	1.1
5.11. Did implementation capacity (human, institutional or administrative) shape design decisi	1.1
5.12. Role of political considerations in shaping policy design.	1.6
Legend:	
	= highest ratings
	= lowest ratings

Source : Traoré et al. (2017a).

### 4.3. Quality of the policy process



Overall, stakeholders rate the quality of Mali's agricultural and food security processes as somewhere between modest and good. The average of all rating criteria, evaluated by participants at 1.8 out of 3, signifies an aggregate rating between modest and good, though closer to good.

The most highly rated features of Mali's policy system concern its inclusiveness, including decision-makers willingness to listen to key stakeholders and to incorporate their views in formulating agricultural and food security policies (Table 6, variables 6.1-6.3). Stakeholders, likewise, value the empirical evidence informing policy debates (variable 6.4)

In contrast, the weakest performance occurs in the actual implementation of policies once enacted. Implementation capacity (variable 6.5) scored only 1.5 out of 3. During our interviews, many respondents expressed the view that the government produces fine policy documents, but then fails to implement the policies effectively.

Institutionally, the ratings reveal clear differences in perceptions. National government civil servants consistently prove most optimistic that the policy process works well, with an average rating of 1.8 out of 3. In contrast, national private sector groups and donors rate implementation capacity as modest or weak, with ratings of 0.8 and 1.2 respectively (Table 6, variable 6.5).

Table 6. Quality of agricultural and food security policy processes in Mali \*

Evaluation criteria	Stakeholder ratings						
	0 = none; 1 = modest; 2 = good ; 3 = excellent						
	Government		Private sector		Researchers	Donors	
	national	regional	national	regional			
<b>Policy formulation process</b>							
6.1. A clearly defined, formal process exists for preparing and validating agricultural policies; the process is well-understood by all stakeholders	2.2	1.8	1.4	1.8	1.5	1.6	1
6.2. Public authorities conduct systematic policy dialogue with stakeholders	2.1	1.9	1.2	1.4	1.8	1.4	1
6.3. In these dialogues, government takes into account all stakeholder opinions	2.3	1.9	1.0	1.8	1.9	1.8	1
6.4. Policy dialogue on agriculture and food security issues is based on sound empirical evidence (representative data and rigorous analysis)	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.2	1
<b>Policy implementation</b>							
6.5. Government has a robust capacity for implementing agricultural and food security	1.9	1.4	0.9	1.8	1.3	1.2	1
6.6. Current systems for policy formulation, implementation and monitoring are capable of responding efficiently to urgent issues	1.9	1.7	1.0	1.7	1.8	0.8	1
<b>Policy monitoring and evaluation</b>							
6.7. Government regularly assesses agricultural sector performance in an open, transparent and timely manner	1.9	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.6	1
<b>6.8. Average of all evaluation criteria</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1</b>
Legend:  = highest ratings  = lowest ratings							
* Table 2 provides respondent numbers from each stakeholder group. Source : Traoré et al. (2017a).							

#### 4.4. Quality of Mali's policy architecture

Overall, nearly two-thirds of agricultural sector stakeholders (64%) indicate that inclusive working groups exist for major policy initiatives (Table 7). Over half participated in a formal policy working groups during 2016 (Table 7). For example, the Minister of Agriculture has established a formal working group to monitor implementation of Mali's large-scale fertilizer subsidy program. Private sector representatives (farmers plus agribusinesses), with participation rates of only 33% to 40%, were the least engaged in policy processes (Table 7, variable 7.1).

National government, donors and national researchers consistently rate the effectiveness of policy working groups somewhere between good and excellent. In contrast, national private sector groups evaluate the quality and effectiveness of policy forums much lower, between modest and good (Table 7, variables 7.3-7.5).

Overall, the satisfaction of agricultural sector stakeholders with agricultural policy processes ranges between modest and good (Table 8). In particular, stakeholders rate policy processes and content as good (Table 8, variables 8.1 and 8.2). In contrast, most stakeholder groups – even the perennially optimistic national government staff – rate resource mobilization for policy implementation as only modest (Table 8, variable 8.3).



Table 7. Quality of the <i>institutional architecture</i> for formulating agricultural and food security policies in Mali*							
Evaluation criteria 0 = none; 1 = modest; 2 = good ; 3 = excellent	Stakeholder ratings						
	Government		Private sector		Researchers	Donors	Academics
	national	regional	national	regional			
<b>Have you participated in a technical working group concerning the agricultural sector over the past 12 months?</b>							
7.1. Yes (percentage of respondents)	63%	63%	40%	33%	67%	60%	57%
<b>How well does this working group function?</b>							
7.2. It is functional	2.2	1.9	1.8	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.0
7.3. It is efficient	2.1	1.7	1.5	2.3	1.8	2.0	1.8
7.4. Discussions are based on credible empirical data and rigorous analysis	1.9	2.0	1.3	1.7	1.8	2.0	1.9
7.5. Government takes the group's decisions and recommendations seriously	2.1	1.7	1.5	2.3	1.8	2.3	1.8
Legend:  = highest ratings  = lowest ratings							
* Table 2 provides respondent numbers from each stakeholder group. Source : Traoré et al. (2017a).							

Table 8. Satisfaction with the policy formulation process for agricultural and food security policies in Mali\*

Evaluation criteria 0 = none; 1 = modest; 2 = good ; 3 = excellent	Stakeholder ratings							
	Government		Private sector		Researchers	Donors	All	
	national	regional	national	regional				
<b>Policy framework</b>								
8.1. Government has embraced transparency and debate in policy processes and decision making.	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.4	1.8	2.0	1.8	
<b>Policy content</b>								
8.2. The content of agricultural policies and programs is consistent with the overarching policy framework for the sector	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.9	2.0	1.8	
<b>Policy implementation</b>								
8.3. Sufficient resources are mobilized to implement agricultural and food security policies	1.0	1.2	0.9	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.1	
<b>Monitoring and evaluation</b>								
8.4. An effective system for monitoring policy implementation is in place and functional	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.2	1.6	1.4	
<b>Donors</b>								
8.5. An effective donor coordination forum exists for the agriculture sector	1.4	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	2.2	1.7	
8.6. In general, donors supporting the agricultural sector make commitments that are clear, realistic and genuine	1.4	1.8	1.3	1.9	1.4	2.2	1.6	
<b>Overall assessment</b>								
8.7. How satisfied are you with the overall quality of policy dialogue and coordination between government and stakeholders?	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.3	1.6	1.4	
	Legend:		= highest ratings					
			= lowest ratings					

\* Table 2 provides respondent numbers from each stakeholder group.  
Source : Traoré et al. (2017a).



## 4.5. Strengths and weaknesses of Mali's policy system

### 4.5.1. Strengths

Stakeholders generally consider policy content and the quality of policy documents to be good. They, likewise, view Mali's agricultural policy process as transparent, inclusive and open, involving both national and regional stakeholder groups. Nevertheless, participation levels differ across groups. National government agencies and agricultural sector donors tend to participate more fully and frequently than other stakeholder groups in agricultural policy debates.

### 4.5.2. Weaknesses

Implementation of agricultural policies is generally seen as weak. Resource mobilization necessary for effective policy implementation remains insufficient according to all stakeholder groups. As a result, institutional capacity to respond effectively to urgent problems remains limited.

Although private sector groups have sometimes lobbied successfully for specific policy changes, stakeholders generally believe that the current policy system marginalizes private sector involvement in ongoing policy processes. In the case of major cash crops, such as cotton and rice, farmer groups operate within well-structured value chains, with cotton managed by the Compagnie Malienne de Développement des Textiles (CMDT) and rice managed by the Office du Niger (ON) in Mali's highly productive Niger River delta. Outside of these well-structured value chains, private sector agribusiness and farming groups feels less engaged and less influential than other stakeholder groups. Given that agricultural policies ultimately become successful only when farmers and agribusinesses invest in ways that raise overall productivity of Mali's agricultural sector, improved agricultural sector performance will likely require increased involvement of farming and agribusiness groups in major policy discussions.

Chapter 5 below summarizes stakeholder prescriptions for addressing each of these challenges.

## 5. STAKEHOLDER PRESCRIPTIONS

### 5.1. Improving private sector participation in the policy process

During the four stakeholder consultation workshops, discussion and debate focused on causes as well as potential solutions to the current observed weaknesses in private sector participation in agricultural policy processes across the board. In part, this current situation stems from weaknesses in the private sector and in part from deficiencies in public sector outreach efforts (Table 9). Suggested solutions aim to address these weaknesses, sometimes individually, sometimes collectively.

Causes	Suggested solutions
<i>1. Private sector weaknesses</i>	
a. weak private sector organizations; predominance of informal sector	help to professionalize existing trade associations, create new ones in key policy arenas
b. weak human resources: low levels of education; limited literacy; language barriers (Bambara vs. French)	disseminate legislative texts and background documents in local languages
c. high cost of managers' time; limited perceived benefits of participation in policy discussions	focus private sector engagement on topics of clear interest; minimize time requirements; bring public sector technicians to private sector venues
<i>2. Public sector deficiencies</i>	
a. absent or inoperational consultative structures focusing on the private sector	strengthen consultative channels focused on private sector; start at regional level on topics of concern to private sector
b. weak policy implementation discourages private sector policy engagement	improve policy implementation (see Table 10)

Source: Samake et al. (2019).

Given the large scale of Mali's informal sector, agricultural stakeholders, not surprisingly, highlighted the overall weaknesses in many Malian private sector organizations which would normally serve as interface with government decision-makers (Table 9, 1a). Organizational weaknesses most frequently emerge among agricultural input suppliers, an arena in which private firms have assumed primary responsibility only relatively recently, following the dismantling of many government parastatals in the 1980s. Currently, seed supply, fertilizer, pesticides and veterinary medicines are largely managed by private suppliers. Yet Mali's seed industry remains in its infancy (Diallo et al. 2017), while fertilizer and pesticides are dominated by a few large players who increasingly find their markets contested by a vibrant but often unorganized collection of small and unregistered firms supplying generic and sometimes fraudulent products of unknown quality (Therault et al. 2017; Haggblade et al. 2017). In contrast, farmer organizations are typically better-structured – through semi-public organizations such as the Compagnie Malienne du Développement des Textiles (in the cotton zone) and the Office du Niger (in the delta) and a hierarchy of producer organizations capped by the Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d'Agriculture au Mali (APCAM). During the 1990's, the cotton groups achieved some stunning successes in lobbying for structural reforms (Bingen 1994, 1998; Tefft 2010). More recently, they have been less influential.

Solutions to these structural weaknesses in private sector organizations revolve around helping to professionalize existing trade associations and to create new ones in key policy arenas. In the area of agricultural input supply, for example, a local NGO named Mali-mark has initiated efforts to help train and register agro-dealers (Figure 1). Continued complaints about low-quality fertilizer and a proliferation of fraudulent pesticides suggest that further efforts in this arena will be required (Keita et al. 2018). Stakeholders also suggested supporting the newly formed Union des chambres consulaires (UCC), with groups together chambers of agriculture, commerce and industry, trade groups, transporters and chargers, at regional and national levels. Although the UCC exists in name, significant efforts will be required to make it fully functional. To do so, it will be necessary to formalize the existence of these unions by passing legislation and subsequently issuing implementing regulations. This formalization will reinforce and invigorate formal frameworks for government consultation with the private sector by raising the level of inclusion of private sector input in decision-making.

Weaknesses in human resources compound organizational efforts in the private sector. Low levels of educational attainment, literacy and French-language competency make organizing difficult (Table 9, 1b). Suggested solutions to this problem revolve around local dialogue in local languages and dissemination of key regulatory texts also in local languages.

A final set of concerns arise from parallel and mutually reinforcing weaknesses in the public and private sectors institutions. In the public sector, stakeholders point to deficiencies, or in some cases an absence, of public consultative structures focusing on issues of concern to the private sector (Table 9, 2a). These shortcomings reinforce the perception of private sector firms that participation in existing formal government forums offer limited benefits yet they impose high participation costs in terms of managers' time. Many firms simply conclude that since their time is better spent running their businesses than sitting in government meetings (Table 9, 1c). Hence the observed low rates of private sector participation in policy forums.

A series of related stakeholder suggestions aim to address both of these problems simultaneously. The suggestions revolve around improving public sector outreach efforts by focusing private sector engagement on specific topics of clear interest to private firms, minimizing time requirements and bringing public sector technicians to private sector venues (chambers of agriculture, input supplier associations, etc.). Many stakeholders suggest starting at regional level on topics of concern to private sector. In Mali, topics such as the new land law, veterinary diseases, fertilizer quality and fraudulent pesticides would attract significant private sector interest.

A recent example from Côte d'Ivoire demonstrates how these more focused policy outreach efforts might work. Like Mali, Côte d'Ivoire has experienced high levels of fraudulent pesticide sales in recent years – in the range of 30% or more (Diarra and Haggblade 2018). As a result, honest traders who pay registration and testing fees complain bitterly about unfair competition from low-priced, unregistered pesticides smuggled in from Asia. Farmers, likewise, complain about a proliferation of fraudulent generic brands, highly variable quality and an inability to distinguish between properly dosed pesticides and low-quality frauds. To address this problem, Côte d'Ivoire has set up a system of district pesticide committees involving local authorities (customs, police, agriculture), farm organizations, and pesticide distributors (Traoré et al. 2018). In this setting, where private sector sees a clear and immediate interest in participation, both farmers and input suppliers readily engage

with public authorities to improve information flows necessary for effective policy implementation – in this example improved enforcement of existing pesticide regulations. According to Côte d’Ivoire’s pesticide trade association, Croplife CI, these joint public-private district committees and associated anti-fraud awareness have resulted in the market share of fraudulent pesticides falling from 30% to 10% (Roger 2019). The key point here is that private firms and farmers readily engage with public authorities when they see tangible benefits; often these are attainable at a local level.

In the case of the Loi d’Orientation Agricole (LOA), article 2 chapter 2 stipulates that farmers can organize themselves freely under the umbrella of Professional Agricultural Organizations created under this legislation. The value chain interprofessional organizations (interprofessions) formed by cotton, rice, maize, mango and beef producers created under this article have served to improve governance of these specific value chains. As an example, official tenders for providing agricultural inputs in the cotton zone pass through a special committee put in place to monitor the selection of bids. Committee membership includes farmer representatives from the le GIE (Union Nationale des Producteurs de Coton, la CMDT et l’OHVN), the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture and importers.

## **5.2. Improving policy implementation**

Despite generally sound agricultural and food security policies, stakeholders believe that policy implementation often proves inadequate. During the stakeholder consultative workshops, participants assessed the causes of lagging implementation and suggested a series of potential solutions (Table 10).

### *5.2.1. Financing*

Government financial resources remain tightly constrained in Mali. As a result, grant funding accounts for roughly 10% - 15% of recurrent budget resources and as much as 20% to 50% of capital spending (IMF 2017, 2018). This high variability stems from noncompliance with disbursement criteria, implicit evidence of the difficulty faced by Malian authorities in satisfactorily mastering donor requirements. These management weaknesses in mastering donor administrative and financial procedures complicate mobilization of external funding for agriculture. Each donor is governed by and therefore imposes their specific administrative and financial procedures. Moreover, since the armed conflict in northern Mali began in 2012, donor funding for agriculture has lagged, while donor support for security measures has increased to the point where it now surpasses agricultural development support (Figure 1).

In response to these budgetary constraints, stakeholders suggest prioritizing efforts to make implementation feasible with existing resources. They likewise recommend improving human resource capacity in financial management in the hopes this will improve Mali’s ability to mobilize donor funding. Improved monitoring and evaluation capacity would serve to improve efficiency of all public spending, whether financed by external or domestic resources.

Causes	Suggested solutions
<i>1. Financing</i>	
a. limited government revenues	adopt policies feasible with available resources
b. donor dependence & conditionality; multiple administrative requirements by individual donors	
<i>2. Human resources</i>	
a. understaffing, retirees not replaced	improve recruitment; review pay scales; terms of service
b. qualifications	reinforce PPP to engage private sector in policy implementation
c. nepotism promotes inefficiency	expand training opportunities
<i>3. Administration</i>	
a. delays between approval of laws and promulgation of enabling decrees and arretes	issue implementing orders promptly
b. insufficient diffusion of policy contents to major stakeholders	translate major policy documents and regulatory texts into local languages
<i>4. Monitoring and evaluation</i>	
a. inadequate M&E, poor understanding of actual rates of policy implementation and its impact	strengthen budgets and human resources of M&E units

Source: Samake et al. (2019).

### 5.2.2. Human resources

Staffing shortages in the civil service plague most ministries in Mali, including the Ministries of Agriculture, Livestock and the Food Security Commissariat. In agriculture alone, roughly 25% of extension posts remain vacant in the Direction Nationale d'Agriculture (DNA) as do 30% of scientific research positions in the Institut d'Economie Rurale (IER), Mali's national agricultural research institution. Retirements projected over the coming decade indicate that IER stands to lose most all its actual senior researchers. In addition, stakeholders complain that nepotism in promotions and placement promotes inefficiency and undermines morale in key public agencies responsible for supporting agricultural development in Mali.

In response, stakeholders advocate wholesale reform of public sector pay scales and conditions of service. In addition, the armed insurrection in northern Mali in 2012 and restoration of civilian rule in 2013 have placed significant stress on Malian government institutions. World Bank efforts have focused on improving government accountability, transparency and public financial management under a US\$50 million International Development Agency (IDA) credit for the *Second Recovery and Governance Reform Support Operation* which ran from 2015 to 2019. A recent evaluation of this program suggests moderately satisfactory, with more work to be done (World Bank 2017)

In addition, stakeholders suggested increasing reliance on private-public partnerships to enlist private sector support for implementation of key policies. In some cases, this might work. The enforcement existing of pesticide regulations offers one such example. Mali's national pesticide laws

and regulations mimic harmonized regional norms developed by the Club inter-état de combat de la sécheresse au Sahel (CILSS) which, in turn, are based on best-practice international norms espoused by the FAO and WHO. Despite rigorous testing and registration requirements, Mali's DNA does not have sufficient resources to effectively monitor markets and enforce product registration requirements. Consequently, fraudulent pesticides account for as much 25% to 45% of total pesticide sales (Haggblade et al. 2018). In a situation such as this, farmers and honest suppliers who do follow regulatory requirement, can become strong allies in helping DNA to monitor and control this widespread fraud. The Côte d'Ivoire model of joint private-public monitoring through district committees could likely work in Mali as well. Similar incentives exist for collaborative implementation of seed and fertilizer regulations.

### *5.2.3. Administrative weaknesses*

In Mali, as in other francophone countries, parliamentary passage of a major law does not imply immediate implementation of the enunciated policy. Instead, ministerial or presidential orders known as *décrets* or *arrêtés* are required to spell out administrative rules for policy implementation. In several recent cases, implementing orders have clearly lagged. Despite parliamentary passage of the Loi d'Orientation Agricole (LOA), in September 2006, the ministry of Agriculture did not issue implementing orders until 2 to 5 years later. For example, the ministerial decree stipulating implementation modalities for seed certification were not issued until 2010, four years after parliamentary passage of the LOA. Similarly, with Mali's new Loi foncière (land titling law) of 2017, ministerial implementation orders have not yet been issued. Stakeholders attribute this slowness to heavy administrative burdens of understaffed ministries. As with other implementation problems, improved staffing and incentive structures would be necessary to resolve this problem fully. Turnovers in government and in ministerial appointments, of course, compound problems of slow implementation.

### *5.2.4. Monitoring and evaluations*

Across government, monitoring and evaluation units remain inadequately staffed and poorly funded. In the case of agriculture, the ministry's designated M&E unit, the Cellule de Planification et de Statistiques du Secteur Développement Rural (CPS/SDR) has 10 senior technical posts unfilled. This implicitly low priority for M&E deprives government decision-makers of the feedback required to track implementation progress, policy impact and identify needs for mid-course corrections or review. To address this problem, the stakeholders suggest strengthening budgets and staffing of CPS/SDR.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

Stakeholders generally view Mali's agricultural policy processes as transparent, inclusive and open, involving both national and regional stakeholder groups. They likewise rate the quality of policy content as generally good.

Nevertheless, agricultural sector stakeholders in the private and public sector identify two areas of weakness. Despite generally sensible policy documents, implementation of agricultural policies is generally seen as weak. Despite the importance of private input suppliers, traders and processor in promoting agricultural growth, these private sector agribusinesses appear to participate in only limited way in Malian agricultural policy debates. If poor implementation discourages private sector participation in policy processes, then weak policy implementation compromises not only the delivery of key public goods required for agricultural growth but also stakeholder input necessary for guiding informed policy decisions.

In a series of four consultative workshops, Mali's agricultural sector stakeholders have suggested a series of practical actions they deem useful as first steps for remedying these two shortcomings. We hope these ideas will prove useful to Mali's new government in improving agricultural policy making processes, policy implementation and agricultural dynamism over time.

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## **Annexe 1. Policy System Diagnostic Survey**

## **Annex 1.1. Evaluation des processus de formulation des politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire au Mali : Une enquête auprès des parties prenantes, Mai 2017**

### Contexte de l'étude

L'enquête proposée fait partie de Feed the Future Mali Projet de recherche sur les politiques de sécurité alimentaire au Mali (PRePoSAM) et a pour objet d'étudier l'architecture institutionnelle et la qualité des processus de formulation des politiques dans le secteur Agricole et la sécurité alimentaire au Mali. Ce projet est géré conjointement par l'Institut d'Economie Rural (IER) du Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'Institut Polytechnique Rural (IPR/IFRA) du Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique et l'Université de l'État du Michigan (MSU) avec un financement de la Mission Mali de l'Agence américaine pour le développement international (USAID).

Des enquêtes similaires sont menées par le projet Food Security Policy (FSP) dans d'autres pays en Afrique (Nigéria, Sénégal et Tanzanie) et en Asie (Birmanie) pour dégager les leçons de meilleures pratiques sur le renforcement des processus de formulation des politiques sur les questions agricoles et de la sécurité alimentaire.

Les répondants à la présente enquête seront contactés à nouveau deux ans après le premier passage pour une mise à jour de l'évaluation sur les sujets abordés afin de mieux comprendre les changements dans l'architecture institutionnelle et la qualité des processus de formulation des politiques Agricoles et la sécurité alimentaire au Mali.

Il convient de préciser que vous êtes libre de choisir volontairement de participer à cette enquête, de refuser de répondre à certaines questions, ou cesser de participer à tout moment. Si vous choisissez de participer, votre aide dans la réponse à ces questions sera grandement appréciée. Vos réponses resteront strictement confidentielles. Vos réponses seront résumées avec celles d'autres parties prenantes au Sénégal et éventuellement d'autres pays. Seules les moyennes générales de l'analyse seront présentées. Pour toute question sur l'étude, veuillez contacter Monsieur Abdramane Traoré du PRePoSAM (tel. 22 20 34 19 ; cel : 76 46 67 07).

Au cours de cette enquête, les données seront collectées sur les aspects suivants :

- **A. Identification de l'interviewé ;**
- **B. Qualité *du processus* de formulation des politiques Agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire ;**
- **C. Qualité *de l'architecture institutionnelle* de formulation des politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire**
- **D. Facteurs qui influent sur la formulation de nouvelles politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire**

### **A. Identification de l'interviewé :**

A1. Nom: \_\_\_\_\_

A2. Genre :            homme \_\_\_\_\_            femme \_\_\_\_\_

A3. Structure/Organisation \_\_\_\_\_

A4. Poste : \_\_\_\_\_

A5. Durée avec la structure ou l'organisation \_\_\_\_\_ ans

A6. Durant l'année 2016 (janvier à décembre) quel est le nombre d'ateliers, de présentations ou de réunions relatifs à la politique Agricole (y compris la sécurité alimentaire) auxquels vous avez participé ? \_\_\_\_\_

A7. Avez-vous participé au processus de formulation d'une politique Agricole ou de sécurité alimentaire ?

a. Oui : \_\_\_\_\_ Non : \_\_\_\_\_

b. Lesquelles ? \_\_\_\_\_

c. En quelle qualité ? \_\_\_\_\_

A8. Quel jugement faites-vous de l'influence de votre organisation sur le processus de changement des politiques agricoles

- 0        aucune influence
- 1        influence limitée
- 2        influences modérées
- 3        influences élevées

## B. Qualité du processus de formulation des politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire

Critères d'évaluation 0 = nulle; 1 = modeste; 2 = bon ; 3 = excellent	Votre appréciation			
	0	1	2	3
<b>Il existe un dialogue systématique sur les questions de politiques agricoles entre</b>				
B1. les représentants des administrations publiques et d'autres parties prenantes				
B2. les représentants du secteur des administrations publiques et votre institution				
<b>Dans ces dialogues, le gouvernement prend en compte les avis</b>				
B3. des parties prenantes				
B4. de votre institution				
B5. Les avis de votre institution sont pris en compte par les acteurs autres que le gouvernement				
<b>Qui participent de manière efficace au dialogue sur les politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire?</b>				
B6. Les agriculteurs ou leurs représentants				
B7. Le secteur privé				
B8. Les Organisations de la société civile (OSC) et les ONG				
B9. Les instituts universitaires et de recherche				
B10. Les partenaires financiers du secteur agricole				
<b>Qualité du processus de formulation</b>				
B11. Les systèmes actuels d'élaboration, de mise en œuvre et de suivi sont capables de répondre aux questions urgentes de manière efficace				
B12. Le dialogue sur les politiques est fondé sur une compréhension claire de la faisabilité, des forces et des faiblesses des options politiques envisagées				
<b>Élaboration des politiques agricole et de sécurité alimentaire</b>				
B13. Il existe une procédure formelle pour l'élaboration et la validation des politiques clairement définie et bien comprise par les parties prenantes				
B14. L'élaboration des politiques, des stratégies, des lois et des règlements sur les questions agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle obéissent systématiquement à un processus formel de prise de décision				
B15. Les processus d'élaboration de politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle sont fondés sur des preuves (données et analyses rigoureuses)				
<b>Exécution des politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire</b>				
B16. Le gouvernement a une capacité robuste de mise en œuvre des politiques agricoles				

B17. Les parties prenantes ont la capacité de s'engager efficacement avec le gouvernement dans l'analyse et la diffusion des politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire				
<b>Évaluation des politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire</b>				
B18. Le gouvernement évalue de façon ouverte, transparente et en temps opportun la performance du secteur agricole				
B19. L'évaluation de la performance du secteur agricole implique activement les représentants des producteurs, les collectivités locales, le secteur privé dans l'agriculture, les OSC, les partenaires financiers et les ONG				
B20. Il existe un système public et transparent de partage de données et d'informations qui rend possibles les évaluations fondées sur des preuves, pour l'élaboration, la mise en œuvre, le suivi et l'évaluation des politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire				
B21. Le pays a la capacité de mener efficacement des analyses indépendantes dans les domaines de l'agriculture et de la sécurité alimentaire				

**C. Qualité de l'architecture institutionnelle de formulation des politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire**

Critères d'évaluation 0 = nulle;1 = modeste; 2 = bon ; 3 = excellent	Votre appréciation			
	0	1	2	3
<b>Existence d'un groupe de travail inclusif qui coordonne et harmonise les politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire?</b>				
C1. Oui ou non (0=non 3=oui)				
Si oui, veuillez préciser ce groupe :				
<b>Comment fonctionne ce groupe de travail?</b>				
C2. Il est opérationnel				
C3. Il est efficace				
C4. Les discussions sont basées sur une connaissance réelle du secteur agricole				
C5. Il sait défendre ses positions sur la conception des politiques et des programmes				
C6. Les positions sont formellement transmises à l'autorité publique				
C7. Les propositions sont prises en compte par l'autorité publique				
C8. Les propositions sont immédiatement suivies d'actions de la part de ses membres				
<b>Votre participation dans les groupes de travail technique du secteur agricole</b>				
C9. Avez-vous participé dans un groupe de travail technique du secteur agricole au courant des derniers 12 mois?(0=non 3=oui)				
Si oui, lequel ?				
<b>Fonctionnement de ces groupes de travail technique (si applicable):</b>				
C10. Ils sont opérationnels				
C11. Ils sont efficaces				
C12. Ils se réunissent fréquemment				
C13. Les discussions sont fondées sur des informations fiables et des analyses rigoureuses				
C14. Ils prennent des décisions claires/pertinentes				
C15. Ils communiquent clairement au groupe coordonnateur ses recommandations				
C16. Les décisions/recommandations sont prises en compte par le groupe coordinateur				
<b>Cadre globale de politiques</b>				
C17. Le contenu des politiques et stratégies sont en conformité avec le cadre de politique générale du secteur				

C18. Le gouvernement a adopté la transparence et le débat dans les prises de décisions.				
<b>Exécution des politiques agricoles</b>				
C19. Les ressources nécessaires sont mobilisées pour la mise en œuvre des décisions politiques				
<b>Suivi évaluation</b>				
C20. Un système efficace d'évaluation des résultats dans le secteur est en place				
C21. Le système d'évaluation des résultats dans le secteur mis en place est fonctionnel				
C22. Des données pertinentes et de qualité sur la performance du secteur agricole sont mises à la disposition des décideurs et du public en temps opportun.				
<b>Partenaires techniques et financiers</b>				
C23. Il existe un forum efficace de coordination des partenaires techniques et financiers.				
C24. En général, les PTF prennent des engagements clairs, réalistes et fondés.				
C25. Les PTF ont adopté la transparence dans les processus de prise de décisions.				
<b>Votre avis global</b>				
C26. Le gouvernement a adopté la transparence et le débat dans le processus de formulation des politiques et de prises de décisions.				
C27. Etes-vous satisfait de la qualité globale du dialogue et de la coordination entre le gouvernement et les parties prenantes ?				



**D. Facteurs qui influencent la formulation de nouvelles politiques agricoles et de sécurité alimentaire**

D1. Identifiez une réforme de politique que vous connaissez le mieux :

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D2. Citez les trois principaux facteurs qui ont motivé cette réforme:

- a)-
- b)-
- c)-

**Evaluez l'importance des facteurs suivants comme motivations de cette réforme**

Facteurs contribuant aux reformes	Spécifier si possible lesquels	Importance du facteur			
		peu		très	
		0	1	2	3
D3. Un événement qui déclenche la réforme					
D4. Un groupe de pression					
D5. Problème pertinent pour des groupes socio - professionnels particuliers de la population ?					
D6. Un problème urgent					
D7. Couverture du problème par les média locaux ?					
D8. Idées et convictions des dirigeants qui ont initié la réforme					
D9. Idées et convictions des autorités politiques ?					
D10. Idées et convictions des PTF ?					
D11. Résultats de recherche ?					
D12. Rapport d'étude des coûts-avantages ?					
D13. Capacité d'exécution (ressources humaines et institutionnelles) ?					
D14. Considérations politiques ?					

Annex 1.2. Institutional representation of interviewees

Stakeholder category	National	Regional
Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AATP</li> <li>• CSP/MDRE</li> <li>• DF</li> <li>• DG Commerce</li> <li>• DNSV</li> <li>• DNPIA</li> <li>• DNP</li> <li>• DNA, Ministry of agriculture</li> <li>• Primature, rural development and policy analysis</li> <li>• National Assembly, Commission Développement Rural</li> <li>• Ministry of Industry, DNI</li> <li>• Ministry of Elevage and Peche</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Agriculture, DRA (Ségou, Sikasso, Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro)</li> <li>• Governor’s Office (Bamako, Kayes, Ségou, Sikasso)</li> <li>• Direction Régionale de la Pêche (Kayes, Koulikoro, Ségou, Sikasso)</li> <li>• Direction Régionale des Eaux et Forêts (Kayes, Koulikoro)</li> <li>• Conseil régional (Kayes, Ségou, Sikasso)</li> <li>• Plan statistique (Kayes)</li> <li>• DRPSIAP( Koulikoro, Segou, Sikasso</li> <li>• Office du Niger</li> <li>• Office Riz</li> <li>• DRPIA (Kayes, Koulikoro, Ségou)</li> </ul>
Private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Association des organisations professionnelles</li> <li>• APCAM</li> <li>• BND</li> <li>• CCIM</li> <li>• CMDT</li> <li>• CNOP</li> <li>• CNPM</li> <li>• Conseil national du patronat</li> <li>• MMDT</li> <li>• Fédération national des groupements interprofessionnels</li> <li>• Mali Mark</li> <li>• Réseau des opérateurs d’intrants agricoles du Mali</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chambre régional de l’agriculture (Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro, Ségou, Sikasso)</li> <li>• Chambre régional de commerce (Kayes, Ségou, Sikasso, Ségou)</li> <li>• Interprofession riz (Segou)</li> </ul>
Researchers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CNRA</li> <li>• CPS/SDR</li> <li>• IER</li> <li>• INSTAT</li> <li>• IPR/IFRA</li> <li>• OMA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IER (Kayes, Sikasso)</li> </ul>
Donors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada</li> <li>• Denmark</li> <li>• France</li> <li>•FAO</li> <li>• IFAD</li> </ul>	
Civil society/ NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Oxfam</li> </ul>	

